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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
DANIEL J. PETERSON,

Case No. 20030802-SC

Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) & -2(5) (2002).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where a suspect is lawfully detained outside in extremely cold weather, does the
Fourth Amendment prevent police from checking the pockets of his coat before handing it
to him?
On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of appeals, not the
decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). The court
of appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, % 8, 13 P.3d
576. "The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court
accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review."
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, | 9, 22 P.3d 1242. The trial court's factual findings

underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed for
clear error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 n.4 (Utah 1994); accord State v. Veteto,
2000 UT 62, If 8, 6 P.3d 1133. The trial court's conclusions of law based on those
findings are reviewed for correctness, "with a measure of discretion given to the trial
judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." Pena, 869 P.2d at 936-39; accord
Veteto, 2000 UT 62,^8.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone,
a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(a), (c)
(1998 & Supp. 2002), and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5, and § 58-37-8(4)(a), (c)
(1998 & Supp. 2002). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant
to a weapons frisk of his discarded coat and shoes. R30-23.1 Following an evidentiary
hearing on 24 January 2002, the trial court orally denied the motion:

*The record is numbered in reverse chronological order.
2

The nub of this case falls on whether or not [Officer Billings] was justified
in picking up that coat and checking it for weapons.. .. We expect officers
to act reasonably and we, we consider whether or not they [are] reasonable
by looking at the totality of the circumstances. I can only imagine [] Barney
Fife conducting a search, making sure the man had no weapons, and then
turning around and handing him the weapon. How dumb is that. If, if
there's a reason to make certain that the man has no weapon and to remove
him from danger, and then immediately as a matter of courtesy hand him a
coat[,] but not check it for weapons that's, that's ludicrous.
And so my finding is that the the (sic), retrieval of the coat because
of the totality of these circumstances was so closely related in time that it
was reasonably related to removing [defendant] from the room, and that it
was practically and reasonably necessary to simply pat the coat and make
sure that he wasn't undoing what he had just done by conducting the Terry
frisk.2
R210:52 (a copy of the oral ruling is attached in addendum B). The trial court
subsequently clarified that defendant had not requested the coat and that it found the frisk
to fall within the parameters of Terry: "[I]t[']s a reasonable check for weapons before he
hands him the coat due to the fact that it's, it's really cold outside, the defendant is there,
it's his coat[.]"R210:54.3
Thereafter, defendant was tried by a jury and convicted for the lesser-included
offense of possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony. R129. He was
2

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

3

Although not expressly referenced by the trial court, presumptively, the trial
court's ruling encompassed the frisk of defendant's shoes which immediately followed
the pat-down of defendant's jacket. See R205:21;R212:111, 166; State v. Peterson, 2003
UT App 300, f 5. The trial court did not rule on defendant's "Motion to Submit
Judgement on Warrantless Search of Shoes," filed 25 January 2000, the day after the trial
court's admissibility ruling on 24 January 2000. See Rl 17. Neither party took up the trial
court's invitation to prepare written findings. See R210:54.
3

convicted as charged for possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A
misdemeanor. Id. The trial court imposed an indeterminate term of zero-to-five years for
the felony offense and a concurrent indeterminate term of one year for the misdemeanor
offense. R194-193. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R198.
On direct appeal, the court of appeals reversed. State v. Peterson, 2003 UT App
300, Tf 13, 77 P.3d 646 (a copy of the opinion is attached in addendum A). According to
the court of appeals, "when Officer Billings picked up [defendant's] coat and patted it
down for weapons, he exceeded the scope of the lawful frisk[,]" because once defendant
himself was frisked and taken outside, "[t]he circumstances that justified the pat-down,
namely the search for weapons, were no longer present[.]" Id.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS4
On 28 December 2001, Officer Billings of the Provo City Police Department
received an anonymous report that methamphetamine was being used by injection in front
of small children at Dawn Webster's apartment. R205:6; R210:4; R212:105; State v.
Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 3. Officer Billings and three other officers went to the

4

On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals and applies
the same standard of review applied by that court. State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, % 3. 985
P.2d 911. The court of appeals reviews the facts in the record in the light most favorable
to the trial court's ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Delaney, 869
P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997).
The trial court relied on the preliminary hearing transcript (see R210:4), in addition to
evidence adduced at the suppression hearing; therefore, the State has included citations to
the preliminary hearing transcript (see R205), along with citations to the suppression
hearing (see R210), and trial (see R212) transcripts, in support of the trial court's ruling.
4

apartment to perform a welfare check. R205:6-7; R210:4; R212:105; Peterson, 2003 UT
App 300, f 3. When Officer Billings knocked on the door, Dawn's mother answered.
R205:18; R212:108; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 3. Dawn came to the door shortly
thereafter. R205:7-8; R212:108; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 3. She consented to a
search of her apartment and belongings. R205:7-8; R210:4; R212:108; Peterson, 2003
UT App 300, p .
Officer Billings followed Dawn to the main bedroom, approximately 25 feet from
the door. R210:5; R212:109. Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 4. The bedroom was
unusually dark because the shades were drawn and the window was draped with a
blanket. R210:9; R212:110, 137. Dawn stepped into the room and picked up her baby
from the crib, Officer Billings followed. R210:6; R212:109, 134. Dawn and Officer
Billings were in the bedroom for no more than three to five seconds when defendant
unexpectedly bolted from the closet, startling both Dawn and the officer. R205:7-8, 2728; R210:6,9; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 4. Dawn "screamed out to her mother
asking what the mother's boyfriend was doing in [her] bedroom"—Dawn had believed
that defendant was in the kitchen with her mother. R205:33; Peterson, 2003 UT App
300, f 4.
Although the closet doors were open, Officer Billings had not seen defendant
inside. R210:6; R212:109; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 4. Defendant's rapid approach
concerned Officer Billings, who reached for his sidearm. R210:9; Peterson, 2003 UT
App 300, f 4. Officer Billings also stepped back and ordered defendant to stop, turn
5

around, and place his hands where the officer could see them. R210:10; Peterson, 2003
UT App 300, T| 4. He then handcuffed defendant and frisked him for weapons. R210:10;
R212:138; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, ^f 4. Finding no weapons on defendant's person,
Officer Billings had another officer escort the barefoot and lightly dressed defendant to
the front porch for safety purposes. R210:l 1, 14-16; R212:l 11; Peterson, 2003 UT App
300, f 4.
Because it was "extremely cold," "twenty degree weather," Officer Billings
decided to take defendant some warmer clothes. R210:37; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \
5. He asked an approximately seven-year-old child also in the room if the coat defendant
had been standing on belonged to him (defendant). R210:ll, 13, 15, 37; R212:lll-112,
138-139; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 5. The child responded affirmatively. R210:l 1;
Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 5. Dawn confirmed that the coat was defendant's—he had
been wearing it "when [she] answered the door." R205:34; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, ^f
5. When Officer Billings picked up the coat, he patted the pockets for safety purposes:
"I'm not going to hand a coat with a loaded gun to somebody in handcuffs." R205:23;
Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 5. The officer's frisk of defendant's coat was essentially
instantaneous with the preceding frisk of defendant's person—separated by less than 60
seconds. R210:13; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 5.
In patting down the coat, Officer Billings "felt something in the pocket... [that]
[f]elt like a syringe." R210:11-12; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 5. Officer Billings took
the syringe into his custody "so that it [could not] be used, destroyed, or used as a weapon
6

against any officers that were there." R205:10; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, | 5. A
brown liquid in the syringe was later tested and found to be methamphetamine.
R212:153, 155; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, ^ 5.
Shortly after Officer Billings found the syringe, Officer Woodall retrieved
defendant's shoes, not more than three feet from the closet. R205:21; R212:l 11, 166;
Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, ^f 5. In doing so, Officer Woodall saw a baggy filled with
syringes inside one of the shoes. R212:l 19-120,167-168; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \
5. Once the syringes were removed, Officer Billings took the jacket and shoes to
defendant, who was standing on the front porch in "20 degree weather," and placed him
under arrest. R205:24; R210:21, 37; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 5.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There is no question that defendant was lawfully detained out-of-doors after he
surprised Dawn and police by bolting out of a closet in a dark bedroom while police
conducted a welfare check on Dawn's children. The only issue is whether the weapons
frisk of defendant's discarded coat and shoes properly fell within the scope of the
indisputably justified frisk of his person, as found by the trial court. The trial court's
ruling is well-supported and the court of appeals' reversal is inconsistent with relevant
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the court of appeals' holding, that the officer
safety justification for frisking defendant's jacket was "no longer present" once he was
removed outside the apartment, is emphatically unreasonable, given that police properly

7

determined to hand defendant his jacket while he was detained in "extremely cold," "20
degree weather."
ARGUMENT
WHERE A SUSPECT IS LAWFULLY DETAINED OUTSIDE IN
EXTREMELY COLD WEATHER, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
DOES NOT PREVENT POLICE FROM CHECKING THE
POCKETS OF HIS COAT BEFORE HANDING IT TO HIM
The trial court ruled that the frisk of defendant's discarded jacket fell within the
scope of the lawful Terry frisk of defendant's person. R210:52, 54. According to the
trial court, it would have been "ludicrous" for Officer Billings not to have checked
defendant's jacket for weapons before handing it to him "as a matter of courtesy" while
he was lawfully detained in "really cold" weather, and because it was "so closely related
in time"—under 60 seconds—to the valid frisk of defendant's person. Id. See also State
v. Peterson, 2003 UT App 300,ffif6, 13, 77 P.3d 646. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that "when Officer Billings picked up [defendant's] coat and patted it down for
weapons, he exceeded the scope of the lawful frisk[,]" because once defendant was
frisked and taken outside, "[t]he circumstances that justified the pat-down, namely the
search for weapons, were no longer present[.]" Id.
The court of appeals' holding overlooks the trial court's finding that Officer
Billings reasonably sought, "as a matter of courtesy," to provide defendant his jacket
during his lawful detention out-of-doors in "really cold" weather. See R210:52, 54. The
court of appeals' holding thus forces Utah law enforcement to choose between leaving a

8

lawfully detained suspect outside in frigid conditions without proper clothing and handing
him a coat that may contain a weapon. Because the Fourth Amendment does not mandate
that humane law enforcement make this uncomfortable choice, the court of appeals'
decision should be overruled.
This Court recently reviewed the origin and limits of weapons frisks, observing
that, under Terry, police "may perform a protective frisk pursuant to a lawful stop when
the officer reasonably believes a person is 'armed and presently dangerous to the officer
or others.'" State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, \ 13, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
24). The initial detention of a suspect must, of course, be for a "valid reason," and "the
officer's subsequent actions must be 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances'
justifying the stop"or detention. Id (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20). This Court
reiterated that "[t]he sole purpose for allowing the frisk is to protect the officer and other
prospective victims by neutralizing potential weapons. 'If a protective search goes beyond
what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry
and its fruits will be suppressed.'" Id. (case citations omitted). See also UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 77-7-16, 77-7-17 (2003) (codifying authority for weapons frisks).
Here, the validity of the Terry frisk of defendant's person is undisputed. See
Peterson, 2003 UT App 300,113. Therefore, the only question is whether the
contemporaneous frisk of defendant's jacket was "'reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances'" justifying the frisk of his person. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 13 (quoting
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Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20). Pertinent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the
scope of a legal weapons frisk, demonstrates that it was.
Terry's progeny has gradually extended the scope of permissible police conduct.
The United States Supreme Court has clarified that Terry, "need not be read as restricting
the preventative search to the person of the detained suspect." Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1047 (1983). Police with reasonable suspicion that a suspect is dangerous and
"may gain immediate control of weapons" can search a vehicle passenger compartment
for weapons. Id. at 1049-1050 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). This extension of Terry
recognizes that "roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially
hazardous," and that "[i]f a suspect is 'dangerous,' he is no less dangerous simply because
he is not arrested." Id. at 1050. Indeed, "if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will
be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any weapons
inside. Or, as [in Long], the suspect may be permitted to reenter the vehicle before the
Terry investigation is over, and again may have access to weapons." Id. at 1052 (citation
omitted).
Both this Court and the court of appeals recognize that Long extended Terry to
authorize searches of a vehicle passenger compartment for weapons, "if the officer has a
reasonable and 'articulable suspicion that the suspect is potentially dangerous.'" See
State v. Schlosser, 114 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (quoting long, 463 U.S. at 1052-55
n. 16). See also State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992) (recognizing that
"the fact, taken in isolation, that a suspect is outside a vehicle while an officer is
10

conducting a search does not overcome an officer's reasonable fear because the suspect
may 'break away from police control and retrieve a weapon from [the] automobile'"
(quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1051).
The court of appeals and other courts, both pre- and post-Long, have extended
Terry to uphold weapons frisks of, among other things, a diaper bag, jacket, duffel bag,
motel room, knapsack, and paper bag. See, e.g., State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 785
(Utah App. 1991) (diaper bag); United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 532, 534-535 (8th Cir.
1980) (duffel bag); State v. Vasquez, 807 P.2d 520, 523 (Ariz. 1991) (jacket); Servis v.
Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 156, 160-161 (Va. App. 1988) (motel room); Jordan v. State,
531 A.2d 1028,1031-1032 (Md. App. 1987) (paper bag); State v. Ortiz, 683 P.2d 822,
828 (Haw. 1984) (knapsack). One case predating Terry by three months, and Long by
fifteen years, upheld a weapons frisk of unworn clothing. See People v. Bowles, 289
N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (1968). The essential recognition in these cases is that "there may
exist circumstances in which the officer might 'reasonably suspect the possibility of harm
if he returns [property] unexamined' and that in such circumstances the officer must be
allowed to 'inspect the interior of the item before returning it.'" See 4 W. LaFave, Search
& Seizure, § 9.5(e), p. 284 (3rd ed. 1996) (quoting Model Rules for Law Enforcement,
Stop and Frisk, rule 605 (1974)).
Like the foregoing authorities, the case at bar presents circumstances where "the
officer might 'reasonably suspect the possibility of harm if he returns [property]
unexamined.'" Id. Indeed, Long recognizes that a roadside suspect continues to be
11

dangerous even after being removed from his vehicle precisely because the suspect "will
be permitted to reenter his automobile" at the conclusion of the investigation, or may even
be "permitted to reenter . . . before the Terry investigation is over" and gain "access to
any weapons inside." Long, 463 U.S. at 1051-1052. In this case, defendant was going to
be handed his coat—given the "20 degree weather"—and could consequently access any
weapon therein. R210:15, 21, 37, 53, 54. Given this unique circumstance, the safety
concerns that allow police to check a vehicle passenger compartment for weapons before
allowing a suspect to reenter likewise allow an officer to check a dangerous suspect's
clothing before handing it to him during a lawful detention outside in "really cold"
weather. Id. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1051-1052.
Rather than analogize to—or even acknowledge—Long and the other pertinent
scope-of-frisk cases cited in the State's Brief of Appellee, at pp. 8-10, 13, the court of
appeals relied on two non-frisk cases and one case dealing with an insufficient
justification for a weapons frisk, but not its scope. See Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, Iffi
12-13 (citing State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991); State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App
100, 68 P.3d 1052); and State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993)). Notably, none
of these cases involved an ongoing safety concern. Thus, the court of appeals overlooked
the continuing danger inherent on these facts—that while lawfully detained in frigid
weather, defendant would be handed his jacket with a weapon concealed therein. See
R210:52,54.

12

Contrary to the court of appeals holding, Officer Billings's pat-down of
defendant's coat was eminently reasonable police action. Id, Indeed, it was even less
intrusive than the frisks upheld in Terry or Long. It was less personally invasive than the
"severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security," upheld in Terry, 392
U.S. at 24-25, because defendant was not wearing his jacket at the time it was frisked.
See State v. Schultz, 491 N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ohio App. 1985) (observing that search of an
unworn coat "[was] a significantly less intrusive official act than a search of the person or
a Jerry-type patdown"). And, it was both less intrusive and less expansive than the
vehicle passenger compartment search for weapons authorized in Long because police
frisked (as opposed to searched) only the specific items of clothing (as opposed to the
whole of a vehicle passenger compartment) defendant discarded before bolting from the
bedroom closet.
The court of appeals' holding, on the other hand, that the dangerous circumstances
justifying the frisk "were no longer present" once defendant was removed from the
apartment, is hyper-technical. See Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 13. The court of
appeals' decision forces upon police officers a Hobson's choice: leave a lawfully detained
suspect outside in frigid weather without proper clothing, or risk handing the suspect a
coat that may contain a weapon. The United States Supreme Court eschews bright line
rules like the "removal rule" adopted by the court of appeals in this case: "Much as a
'bright line' rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is

13

unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid
criteria." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 683, 685 (1985).
Moreover, as previously recognized by this Court, "[t]he touchstone of [an]
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security."
Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 31 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19)). See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219
(1979) (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he key principle of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness—the balancing of competing interests"). "The Fourth Amendment is not,
. . . a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches
and seizures." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, reviewing
courts must be wary of
allowing] the theoretical, sanitized world of [their] imagination to replace
the dangerous and complex world that policemen face every day. What
constitutes 'reasonable' action may seem quite different to someone facing
a possible assailant than to someone analyzing the question at leisure.
Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992).
Thus, while "the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been
accomplished by 'less intrusive' means," given defendant's lack of proper clothing for the
frigid weather, the humane decision to hand him his coat can hardly be characterized as
unreasonable. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686-687 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433, 447 (1973) ("The fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have

14

been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does not, by itself, render the search
unreasonable5").
Finally, for the same reasons the frisk,of defendant's jacket was valid, the
subsequent frisk of his shoes was also valid. See Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 5.
Although unexplained by either the trial court or the court of appeals, this is so because it
necessarily follows that if the jacket frisk yielding meth syringes was justified, the frisk of
defendant's shoes immediately thereafter was at least as justified, if not more so, because
it was preceded by probable cause to arrest. See R28-27, R205:21. "A search is not
invalid despite the fact that it precedes a formal arrest, so long as the arrest and search are
substantially contemporaneous and probable cause to effect the arrest exists independent
of the evidence seized in the search." See State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111-1112 (Utah
App. 1988). See also Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,fflj10-13, 52 P.3d 1158 ("[A]n
appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from it if is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record." (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original)).
CONCLUSION
If the court of appeals' hyper-technical "removal rule" is left intact, it will remain
unclear to law enforcement and lower courts when and under what circumstances the
Fourth Amendment allows protective frisks of a lawfully detained suspect's personal
items which police seek to hand a dangerous suspect during or immediately after a valid

15

detention. This Court should therefore reverse the court of appeals' decision and affirm
the trial court's admissibility ruling.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on 2^3 April 2004
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Daniel J. PETERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20020341-CA.
Sept. 5, 2003.

Defendant was convicted in the Fourth District
Court, Provo Department, R. Taylor, J.? possession
of
methamphetamine,
and
possession
of
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone. Defendant
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held
that search of defendant's coat and shoes exceeded
the scope of an otherwise justified Terry frisk.
Reversed.

West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law €=^H34(3)
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases
[1] Criminal Law €^H53(1)
HOkl 153(1) Most Cited Cases
[1] Criminal Law €=>l 158(4)
HOkl 158(4) Most Cited Cases
Factual findings underlying a trial court's decision
to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are
reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to
the trial judge's application of the legal standard to
the facts.
[2] Arrest €=^63.5(9)
35k63.5(9) Most Cited Cases
Search of coat and shoes of defendant, who was
convicted of possession of methamphetamine and

Page 1

possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone,
exceeded the scope of an otherwise justified Terry
frisk; after defendant had been frisked and removed
from premises, circumstances that justified
pat-down, namely search for weapons, were no
longer present when officer searched coat that was
lying on floor, and thus, when officer picked up
coat and patted it down for weapons, he exceeded
the scope of the lawful frisk. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4; U.C.A.1953, 58-37-8. .
[3] Searches and Seizures €==>23
349k23 Most Cited Cases
The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantees the right of people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
however, what the Constitution forbids is not all
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches
and seizures. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
[4] Arrest €==>63.5(8)
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases
When an officer is justified in believing that an
individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others, the officer may
conduct a pat-down or frisk to determine whether
the person is in fact carrying a weapon; however,
such search must be strictly limited to that which is
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might
be used to harm the officer or others nearby.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
[5] Arrest €=>63.5(8)
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases
In determining what is reasonable during a
pat-down search or frisk, an appellate court must
ask first whether officer's action was justified at its
inception, and second, whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
*646 Margaret P. Lindsay, Aldrich Nelson Weight
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Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney Generals Office and
Marian Decker, Assistant Attorney General, Salt
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Before
Judges
GREENWOOD.

BENCH,

DAVIS,

and

OPINION

Billings had been in the bedroom for approximately
three or five seconds when Peterson unexpectedly
emerged from the closet wearing light clothing and
no shoes. Webster screamed out to her mother
asking what the mother's boyfriend was doing in
Webster's bedroom. [FN1] Startled by Peterson's
emergence from the closet, Officer Billings stepped
back and ordered Peterson to stop, turn around, and
place his hands where the officer could see them.
Peterson complied and Officer Billings then
handcuffed him and patted him down for weapons.
Finding no weapons, Officer Billings asked another
officer to escort Peterson outside.

BENCH, Judge.
^f 1 Peterson appeals his convictions for
possession of methamphetamine, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(a), (c) (1998 & Supp.2002),
and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone,
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 58-37a-5 and 58-37-8(4)(a), (c) (1998 &
Supp.2002). On appeal, Peterson claims that the
search of his coat and shoes exceeded the scope of
an otherwise justified Terry frisk. See *647Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889
(1968). We agree. We therefore reverse his
convictions.

BACKGROUND
U 2 The facts of this case are recited in the light
most favorable to the trial court's findings from the
suppression hearing. See State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d
4, 5 (Utah Ct.App. 1994).
U 3 On December 28, 2001, Officer Russ Billings
of the Provo City Police Department received an
anonymous report that adults were using
methamphetamine in the presence of children at a
Provo residence. Officer Billings, along with
several other officers, went to the residence to
perform a welfare check on the children. A woman
answered the door and informed Officer Billings
that her adult daughter, Dawn Webster, was the
tenant. Webster came to the door shortly thereafter
and, according to Officer Billings, gave consent to
the officers' entry and search of her apartment.
<|[ 4 Officer Billings proceeded with Webster to a
bedroom, upstairs and down a short hallway, where
Webster's baby was sleeping. Webster and Officer
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim

FN1. Webster knew Peterson was in the
apartment, but thought he was in the
kitchen with her mother.
U 5 Within about sixty seconds of the pat-down,
Officer Billings noticed a coat on the floor of the
closet where Peterson had been standing. Officer
Billings asked a child who had entered the bedroom
if the coat belonged to Peterson. The child
responded affirmatively. Webster confirmed that
the coat belonged to Peterson, and that Peterson had
been wearing it when she answered the door.
Officer Billings picked up the coat, intending to
take it to Peterson. For safety purposes, he patted
down the pockets of the coat. In doing so, Officer
Billings felt a syringe in the right pocket. Officer
Billings removed the syringe, which contained a
brown liquid that later tested positive for
methamphetamine. Meanwhile, another officer
picked up a pair of shoes within three feet of the
closet. Inside one of the shoes, the officer found a
baggy full of syringes. Once the syringes were
removed from Peterson's coat and shoj&^illfficer
Billings took the items to Peterson who, by then,
was standing on the front porch in the "extremely
cold" December weather. Peterson was then
arrested for drug offenses.
If 6 Before trial, Peterson moved to suppress all
evidence found in his coat and shoes, claiming it
was obtained by an illegal search and seizure. The
trial court denied Peterson's motion to suppress,
finding that the search of the coat and shoes was
within the scope of a lawful Terry frisk. Peterson
was subsequently convicted of possession of
methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Peterson
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] H 7 "The factual findings underlying a trial
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress evidence are reviewed under the
deferential clearly-erroneous standard, and the legal
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's
application of the legal standard to the facts." State
v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah
Ct.App.1996).
ANALYSIS
[2] [3] U 8 "The Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution guarantees the 'right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' " State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131
(Utah 1994) *648 (quoting U.S. Const, amend. IV).
However, "what the Constitution forbids is not all
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches
and seizures." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88
S.Ct 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)
(quotations and citation omitted).
[4] 1f 9 "When an officer is justified in believing
that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others," the officer
may conduct a pat-down or frisk "to determine
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon."
Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868. However,
such search must be strictly "limited to that which is
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might
be used to harm the officer or others nearby." Id. at
26, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Professor LaFave explains that
"the limited search permitted by Terry, it is
important to remember, is to find weapons" that
might be used to assault the officer. Wayne R.
LaFave, 4 Search & Seizure Law: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment, § 9.5(b), at 274 (3d ed.1996).
Utah courts have consistently upheld limited
searches for weapons under Terry. In State v.
Bradford, 839 P.2d 866 (Utah Ct.App.1992), we
stated that, under Terry, "when an officer
reasonably believes a suspect is dangerous and may
obtain immediate control of weapons, a protective
search is justified." Id. at 870 (citation omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Roybal, 716
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim

P.2d 291 (Utah 1986), held that an officer may
conduct a protective weapons search only if "a
reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances
would be warranted in the belief that his [or her]
safety or that of others was in danger." Id. at 293
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868).
[5] U 10 In determining what is reasonable during
a pat-down search or frisk, we must ask first
"whether the officer's action was justified at its
inception," and second, "whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S.
at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Peterson concedes that the
frisk of his person was justified at its inception.
Therefore, we limit our analysis to the scope of the
search.
1f 11 The second prong of the Terry analysis asks
whether the scope of the search was reasonably
related to the circumstances that justified the
interference. See id.; accord State v. Chapman,
921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996); State v. Johnson,
805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991). In other words, we
must determine whether the subsequent action of
searching the coat and shoes was within the scope
of the frisk conducted on Peterson's person.
K 12 Utah courts have addressed the issue of
scope in different contexts. In Johnson, 805 P.2d at
764, the Utah Supreme Court held that running a
warrants check on a passenger in an automobile that
had been properly stopped exceeded the appropriate
scope of detention. Similarly, in State v. White, 856
P.2d 656 (Utah Ct.App.1993), we held that the
police officer exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk
when the need for a frisk had dissipated.
Furthermore, in State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 100,
68 P.3d 1052, we held that a police officer's request
for a defendant's identification during the arrest of
another person "exceeded the scope of the reasons
justifying the initial detention and unnecessarily
expanded its duration in scope." Id. at U 8. In fact,
the scope of the detention was "limited to ensuring
that defendant had no weapon in his hands and was
in no position to violently interfere with the arrest."
Id. at 1J22.
U 13 As in Terry and the above cases, the
authority and scope of a frisk for weapons carried
out by Officer Billings must be "narrowly drawn."
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The facts of
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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the present case are undisputed. After Officer
Billings entered the room, Peterson suddenly
emerged from the closet. Fearing for his own safety
and the safety of others present, Officer Billings
lawfully and justifiably conducted a pat-down of
Peterson's person. After ensuring that Peterson did
not have a weapon, Officer Billings asked another
officer to escort Peterson outside. Peterson was
then removed from the room and ultimately from
the premises. There then remained no reasonable
expectation or apprehension that Peterson could
access a weapon or would otherwise interfere with
the welfare check. The circumstances *649 that
justified the pat-down, namely the search for
weapons, were no longer present when Officer
Billings searched the coat that was lying on the
floor. Therefore, when Officer Billings picked up
the coat and patted it down for weapons, he
exceeded the scope of the lawful frisk. The
evidence seized from the coat and shoes is therefore
not admissible.
CONCLUSION
If 14 We are persuaded that the search of
Peterson's coat exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk.
The safety and weapons concerns were no longer
present after Peterson had been frisked and
removed from the premises. We therefore reverse
the convictions.

f 15 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS and
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judges.
77 P.3d 646, 481 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2003 UT App
300
END OF DOCUMENT
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - PROVO COURT

2

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4 STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

5
6

SUPPRESSION HEARING

vs.

7 DANIEL J. PETERSON,

Case
Appeal

021400075
20020341-CA

V

r

8
Defendant.

;^c

Judge James R. Taylor
^

9

\

10
11
12
13
14

BE IT REMEMBERED

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on January 24, 2002.
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:

15
16
17
18

CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

19
(From Electronic Recording)
20
21
22
23
24
25

ORIGINAL

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

AUG 2 1 2C02
Pauiette Stagg
Clerk of the Court
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PENNY C. ABBOTT, REPORTER-TRA
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1

He's still securing the area, it's still a Terry frisk.
And the state would ask that you rule that way,

2
3

Your Honor.

Thank you.
COURT'S RULING

4
5

THE JUDGE:

All right.

Thank you.

6

Well, these are interesting facts and I think I

7

need to, I need to make some factual findings before I rule

8

on the law.
As I see the evidence and as I understand the

9
10

evidence this is, this is how I find it for the purposes of

11

this hearing.

12

take it as anonymous because it was never described, it was

13

apparently dispatched so we don't know where the report came

14

from.

15

meth, methamphetamine possibly being used by injection, but

16

at least being used in front of children in the apartment,

17

and that they were going to the apartment for the purpose of

18

determining if children were in danger because of meth use in

19

their presence.

The officers had a report of, and I can only

But the information they were given was that there was

The officer testified from his experience that when

20
21

there is suspected drug use in a residence or in a situation

22

like that that there's a heightened amount of danger, that he

23

goes into it with a, a raised level of apprehension and

24

concern.

25

He knocked on the door.

It was answered by an

STATE VS. DANIEL J. PETERSON
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PAGE 47

1

older lady and then who was soon joined by a younger lady who

2

was apparently the tenant of the home, she testified at the

3

preliminary hearing.
The officer entered the apartment, walked through

4
5

the apartment, up some stairs, down a hall, around a turn,

6

down a hall, and into a bedroom.

7

was, there was a baby in the bedroom in the crib.

8

was unusually dark, darker than just from turning off the

9

lights, the shades were drawn and there were additional

10

blankets or sheets or something put up to make the room

11

darker than normal.

12

attend to the baby.

13

the concern was whether or not drugs had been used in the

14

room.

15

feet, several steps, I don't recall which.

16

clearly entered the room, had not at that point noticed the

17

defendant, had been there for a couple of seconds, briefly

18

entered the room.

19

It was a back bedroom, it
The room

The mother stepped into the room to
It had been explained to the mother that

The officer followed the mother into the room several
But he had

At that point the defendant came from the closet.

20

The closet, as I understand it the doors were not closed but

21

the defendant had not been seen.

22

he was positioned in the closet or because it was dark, it

23

wasn't made clear, but he hadn't been noticed.

24

the area of the closet quickly.

25

Whether because of the way

The mother was surprised.

He came from

Her testimony was, and
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JANUARY 24, 2002
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber
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1

I'm looking at page 33 of the transcript of the preliminary

2

hearing, page 33 line 14, the question was...

3

at line 11. Well starting at the beginning of the page.

4

The question was:

5

Q.

6

Well, starting

"Were you in the room when Mr. Peterson
came from out of the closet?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Did that surprise you?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Why?

11

A.

I thought he was still in the kitchen
with my mother.

12
13

Q.

Where was he when the officers arrived?

14

A.

In the kitchen.

15

Q.

He was in the kitchen?

Do you know what

16

he had, did you know that he had then

17

gone and hid in the closet?

18

A.

No, I didn't know where he went.

19

Q.

when you saw him go out of the closet
what did you exclaim?

20
21

A.

I screaming out my mother and"...

22

And I said, "I'm sorry"?

23

The witness said:

24
25

A.

"! I screaming out my mom and asked her
why her boyfriend was in my room."
STATE VS. DANIEL J. PETERSON
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So the mother was startled, was surprised and was

1
2

concerned that he had somehow gotten to the, gotten to the

3

room.

4

a sudden movement.

So she was frightened.

The officer was frightened,

What happened next is that the officer stopped him,

5
6

put up his hands, whether he spoke to him or whether he

7

physically stopped him, he stopped him, turned him around, he

8

did a frisk and had him removed from the room.

9

within 60 seconds later, I think at the outside it was

And then

10

within, within a minute, within 60 seconds or a little less

11

he, he sees the coat.

12

year old child, a girl says yes, that's his coat.

13

feels the coat, feels the syringe, and then took the coat out

14

to him and found that he had been taken out to the front

15

porch.

16

He says is this his coat?

And a seven
And he

Those are the facts as I understand them.
I'm, I'm really uncomfortable applying the arrest

17

and search doctrine in cases.

Those, those cases, Chimmel

18

(phonetic) was an automobile stop, and most of those cases

19

arise from stops on the freeway or stops of vehicles.

20

and it's very plain that the court is making a bright line so

21

that officers don't have to make those judgment calls, can I

22

search, can I not search.

23

taking a defendant out of a car and making him stand by the

24

side of the road to justify their search, when it would be

25

simply safer to put him in the patrol car and secure the

And,

We don't want them, for instance,
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1

situation before you do a search.
And in any one of those cases that I'm familiar

2

3 with, a Terry frisk of his car is, is really a stretch.
4

Usually what it is is that the officer would have the right

5

to search the car, they have some probable cause, they have

6

some suspicion that justifies a search of the car if the

7

defendant is there.

8

to leave him there because that's dumb and it's not safe by

9

the side of the road.

And the courts have said you don't have

And there are all these circumstances

10

that have to do with automobiles and roadways for officer

11

safety.

12

None of them apply.

This is a house.

The question for me and the totality of the

13

circumstances, the initial frisk was justified, that's the

14

first question.

15

heightened, a heightened concern because of potential drug

16

use, we've got a baby in the room, we've got a darkened room,

17

we've got a person who is by all accounts surprisingly in the

18

room, certainly to the mother, to the officer, who bolts out,

19

comes quickly.

20

circumstances being concerned about his person.

21

stopping the defendant, conducting a Terry frisk and removing

22

him from the room is completely consistent with the totality

23

of the circumstances as I see it.

24

potential drug use from babies.

25

he doesn't, doesn't have proof of drug use he has a situation

And I find that it was.

We've got a

The officer is justified in that totality of
And

He was there to remove
And, and while he hasn't,
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1

that's a concern to the mother, obviously, she didn't expect

2

this man to be in the room.

3

movement.

4

security is absolutely justified.

5

room.

6

And, and we've got a sudden

The Terry frisk and the action to protect his
Remove him from the

The nub of this case falls on whether or not he was

7

justified in picking up that coat and checking it for

8

weapons.

9

and we, we consider whether or not they're reasonable by

We don't...

We expect officers to act reasonably

10

looking at the totality of the circumstances.

11

imagine (short inaudible) Barney Fife conducting a search,

12

making sure the man had no weapons, and then turning around

13

and handing him the weapon.

14

there's a reason to make certain that the man has no weapon

15

and to remove him from danger, and then immediately as a

16

matter of courtesy hand him a coat but not check it for

17

weapons that's, that's ludicrous.

18

How dumb is that.

I can only

If, if

And so my finding is that the, the retrieval of the

19

coat because of the totality of these circumstances was so

20

closely related in time that it was reasonably related to

21

removing him from the room, and that it was practically and

22

reasonably necessary to simply pat the coat and make sure

23

that he wasn't undoing what he had just done by conducting

24

the Terry frisk.

25

Therefore, I deny the motion.
STATE VS. DANIEL J. PETERSON
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MR. ELDRIDGE:

1
2

Your Honor may I, may I make two

additional points?

3

THE JUDGE:

No.

I've ruled.

4

MR. ELDRIDGE: May I point you to another case?

5

THE JUDGE:

Save it for the court of appeals.

6

You've made your argument, I've ruled.

7

denied.

8

MR. EASTON:

9

THE JUDGE:

Thank you, Your Honor.
If you wish to prepare findings I'll

10

be happy to consider them.

11

consider additional argument, Counsel.

But I'm, I'm not going to
I've ruled.

MR. ELDRIDGE: Well, I'd like to point the case, to

12
13

The motion is

the State vs. Beavers which indicates—

14

THE JUDGE:

Well—

15

MR. ELDRIDGE:

16

THE JUDGE:

17

MR. ELDRIDGE:

18

THE JUDGE:

19

MR. ELDRIDGE:

—that if there's an exigency—

Counsel—
Created by the police that—

Counsel, I have ruled.
Okay.

Now I would, I would make an

20

additional motion, Your Honor, for the Court to reconsider

21

its ruling based on State vs. Beavers, and I've got that case

22

here if you need it.

23

THE JUDGE:

I'm very familiar with State vs.

24

Beavers.

That wasn't a (inaudible word) search, and I

25

understand the circumstances of the case.

But in my view the
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1

totality of the circumstances there and here are different.

2

MR. ELDRIDGE:

And may I, may I ask so the ruling

3

of the Court is that the search of the coat falls under the

4

Terry frisk doctrine?

5

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

6

MR. ELDRIDGE:

7

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Yes.

That it's, it's a reasonable

8

check for weapons before he hands him the coat due to the

9

fact that it's, it's really cold outside, the defendant is

10

there, it's his coat, he removes the coat with the—
MR. ELDRIDGE:

11

May I ask the Court to make an

12

amendment to their findings that, and I think it's supported

13

by the state, by the testimony of Officer Billings, that

14 Mr. Peterson never asked for the coat?
MR. EASTON:

15
16

I think that's in the record, Your

Honor.
THE JUDGE:

17

That's in the record.

What I will

18

tell you to do because I know that this is a potential basis

19

for appeal, it's critical to the case, either of you or both

20

of you prepare findings.

21

the findings or one of you wants to prepare them and submit

22

them, I'll be happy to look at the findings and sign them so

23

you can have your complete record. I think you understand

24

it.

25

If you can come to an agreement on

We're set for trial next Monday.

Are there other
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2

issues we can or need to address before the trial?
MR. EASTON:

I believe in our conference call the

3

other day it was unclear based after the determination of

4

this motion whether it would still be a jury trial.

5
6

THE JUDGE:

It is unless somebody asks me to waive

the jury or asks to waive the jury and—

7

MR. ELDRIDGE:

8

minutes to talk with Mr. Easton—

9
10
11
12
13
14

THE JUDGE:

Your Honor, if I could have a few

Certainly.

MR. ELDRIDGE:

—

and my client Mr. Peterson, we

might have some work to do on that.
THE JUDGE:
minutes or so.

We'll take a short recess for five

Let me know if you need to come back.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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